Modeling of Helicopter Pilot Misperception During Overland Navigation by Cowden, Bradley T.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2012-03
Modeling of Helicopter Pilot
Misperception During Overland Navigation
Cowden, Bradley T.













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
MODELING OF HELICOPTER PILOT MISPERCEPTION 








 Thesis Advisor:                                             Ji Hyun Yang 
   Co-Advisor:                                                  Quinn Kennedy 
 Second Reader:                                             Harrison Schramm 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202–4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704–0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
March 2012 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  Modeling of Helicopter Pilot Misperception During 
Overland Navigation  
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Bradley T. Cowden 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943–5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.  IRB Protocol number ______N/A______.  
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
This thesis provides a framework to model human belief and misperception in helicopter overland navigation. Helicopter overland 
navigation is a challenging mission area because it is a complex cognitive task, and failing to recognize when the aircraft is off-
course can lead to operational failures and mishaps.  A human-in-the-loop experiment to investigate pilot misperception during 
simulated overland navigation by analyzing actual navigation trajectory, pilots’ perceived location, and corresponding confidence 
levels was designed. Fifteen military officers with prior overland navigation experience completed four simulated low-level 
navigation routes, two which entailed autonavigation.  Analysis shows that there is not a negative correlation between perceived 
and actual location of the aircraft, inferring that confidence is not a good indicator of performance.  There is however some 
evidence that there is a negative correlation between perceived location and intended route of flight, suggesting that there is a bias 
towards that intended flight route.  If aviation personnel can proactively identify the circumstances in which usual misperception 
occur in navigation, they may reduce mission failure and mishap rate.  Fleet squadrons and instructional commands can benefit 






14. SUBJECT TERMS Training, Simulation, Human Factors, Aviation, Helicopter, Navigation, 
Confidence, Overconfidence, Perception, Misperception, Bayes 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
110 

















NSN 7540–01–280–5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 
 ii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 




Bradley T. Cowden 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
B.S., Naval Postgraduate School, 2012 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 



























Robert F. Dell, PhD 
Chair, Department of Operations Research 
 iv 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis provides a framework to model human belief and misperception in helicopter 
overland navigation. Helicopter overland navigation is a challenging mission area 
because it is a complex cognitive task, and failing to recognize when the aircraft is off-
course can lead to operational failures and mishaps.  A human-in-the-loop experiment to 
investigate pilot misperception during simulated overland navigation by analyzing actual 
navigation trajectory, pilots’ perceived location, and corresponding confidence levels was 
designed. Fifteen military officers with prior overland navigation experience completed 
four simulated low-level navigation routes, two which entailed autonavigation.  Analysis 
shows that there is not a negative correlation between perceived and actual location of the 
aircraft, inferring that confidence is not a good indicator of performance.  There is 
however some evidence that there is a negative correlation between perceived location 
and intended route of flight, suggesting that there is a bias towards that intended flight 
route.   If aviation personnel can proactively identify the circumstances in which usual 
misperception occur in navigation, they may reduce mission failure and mishap rate.  
Fleet squadrons and instructional commands can benefit from this study to improve 
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 This thesis provides a framework to model human belief and 
misperception in helicopter overland navigation. Helicopter overland navigation is a 
challenging mission area because it is a complex cognitive task, and failing to recognize 
when the aircraft is off-course can lead to operational failures and mishaps.  
Methods: 
 Systematic biased perception during an overland navigation was observed 
in Sullivan et al. (2010). In the current study, we design a human-in-the-loop experiment 
to investigate pilot misperception during simulated overland navigation by analyzing 
actual navigation trajectory, pilots’ perceived location, and corresponding confidence 
levels. Fifteen military officers with prior overland navigation experience completed four 
simulated low-level navigation routes, two which entailed autonavigation. 
Results: 
  Data was collected regarding the amount of time the participants spend in 
the “dangerous” off track and high confidence area of perception, the correlation between 
perception and confidence, and the relation of confidence and error versus time. Data was 
categorized into four quadrants based off perception error and corresponding confidence 
levels; eg, “On-track” with “High” or “Low” confidence and “Off-track” with “High” or 
“Low” confidence.  Subjects were “On-track” and had a corresponding “High” 
confidence 58.37% of the time, but the second most frequent state was the dangerous 
quadrant, “Off-track” yet still confident that they are “On-track.” Of the time pilots were 
“Off-track” (34.65%), they had wrong perception 77.86% of the time.  This observation 
was more explicit in autonavigation scenarios at 81.55%.  Hypothesis testing was 
conducted to determine if there is a negative correlation between the distance between 
actual and perceived location of the aircraft versus confidence, if there is a negative 
correlation between the distance between the perceived location of the aircraft and 
intended route of flight, and if confidence and perception error increases with time of 
 xvi 
flight.  Analysis shows that there is not a negative correlation between perceived and 
actual location of the aircraft, inferring that confidence is not a good indicator of 
performance.  There is however some evidence that there is a negative correlation 
between perceived location and intended route of flight, suggesting that there is a bias 
towards that intended flight route.  Lastly, confidence tends to decrease while perception 
error increases the longer the pilot navigates. 
Implication: 
 If aviation personnel can proactively identify the circumstances in which 
usual misperception occur in navigation, they may reduce mission failure and mishap 
rate.  Fleet squadrons and instructional commands can benefit from this study, especially 
for use in search and rescue, anti-surface warfare, combat search and rescue, and naval 
special warfare operations because of the low-level navigation flight profiles required.  
This study can also improve crew resource management inside the helicopter cockpit.  
Helicopter crews are heavily reliant on each member of the crew, and additional 
complacency can occur when one of the members is confident that they are on course. 
 
 
KEYWORDS: Training, Simulation, Human Factors, Aviation, Helicopter, Navigation, 
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A. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE(S) 
The goal of this research is to understand pilot’s perception and confidence during 
overland navigation, and why these may lead to visual misperception.  Mishaps and 
mission failure have been linked to improper navigation, and these problems increase 
when the pilot is unaware of their miscalculations.  Although it is recognized that 
misperception during navigation is dangerous, we are unaware of studies that use 
quantitative analysis to link the specific factors of why pilot misperception is prevalent.  
We seek to address this critical question in order to develop training and tools to improve 
the problem. 
In this study, participants were placed in a high cognitive workload simulated 
environment based on real-word scenarios and their performance was evaluated.  We 
evaluate performance by measuring the distance between the participant’s perceived 
location, compared to their actual location, and their corresponding confidence level.  
Results from the study are expected to be used to improve pilot training, crew 
coordination, and aircraft or cockpit design and technologies. 
B. BACKGROUND 
1. Helicopter overland navigation 
Helicopter overland navigation is a challenging and complex cognitive task.  
Helicopter overland navigation is comprised of a number of sub-skills that require 
continuous visual cue perception and decision making.  The “Flight Training Instruction, 
Instrument and Navigation Advanced Phase, TH-57” states that the “Pilot Not At the 
Controls (PNAC) is primarily responsible for accurate navigation.  He must remain 
oriented at all times, monitor cockpit instruments, and perform assigned cockpit duties as 
briefed.  During an aircraft or system emergency, he executes the emergency procedures 
as briefed by the pilot”(CNATRA P-458).  The navigational task can be done by visual 
navigation, dead reckoning, or electronic navigation using Global Positioning System 
(GPS), Doppler Radar, or some other system.  Visual navigation is performed by 
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comparing terrain features on a map to what is seen out the window of the aircraft.  Dead 
reckoning involves taking a known position and by using direction and timing.  Advances 
in GPS technology have decreased the use of visual navigation and dead reckoning, yet 
can still only be used as a form of backup navigation in all fleet aircraft and a critical skill 
if ever required to.  The PNAC may use all three forms of navigation, separately or in 
combination, in order to accurately navigate through low-level terrain.  On top of this 
heavy navigational workload, the PNAC’s most important role is to assist the Pilot At the 
Controls (PAC) in obstacle avoidance.    Because of the complex cognitive task placed on 
the nonflying aviator, it is easy to deviate from course.  Straying off course is not an issue 
if the aviator is aware of being off course.  However, often the aviator is unaware of 
being off course. 
2. Misperception and Overconfidence 
Misperception can lead to both mission failure by the aircraft not reaching its 
intended destination on time, and also mishaps due to the pilot flying into obstacles in the 
terrain.  The Navy Safety Center has adopted James Reason’s Swiss cheese model for 
understanding the underlying process that results in mishaps (Reason, 2000).  The Swiss 
cheese model relates a system to a stack of slices of Swiss cheese. Each slice of cheese is 
a layer of the system, and the holes are analogous to opportunities for the system to fail.  
Mishaps occur only when the holes line up allowing failures to pass through without 
being stopped by another system.  This research focuses on the slice that relates to pilot 
judgment.  There are two particular recent mishaps that expose the importance of 
exploring information on the subject.  The first mishap involved an MH-60S with 17 
individuals on board.  In this mishap, they were flying in a new area when unexpected 
bad weather arrived.  They tried to deviate from the intended course to a nearby landing 
field.  The crew relied heavily on visual navigation because they did not have the divert 
airfield in their cockpit navigational computer.  This lack of information, along with the 
low cloud layer, caused the crew to misperceive their location, and ultimately lead to a 
crash landing in the snow covered West Virginia mountains.  The second mishap 
involved a senior pilot and aircrew flying a MH-60S under daytime clear atmospheric 
conditions.  The senior pilot had a vast knowledge of the area, but decided to not follow 
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course rules back to their home station.  They hit power lines and crashed the helicopter.  
This mishap was due to overconfidence in the pilot on where they perceived they were 
flying.  The pilot’s confidence contributed to the complacency of the co-pilot and 
aircrew.  Luckily, in both of these mishaps no one was killed, but it did highlight the fact 
that misperception can have drastic consequences. 
3. Related research 
Table 1 presents a matrix derived from signal detection theory (SDT) showing the 
four different awareness states of a navigating pilot (Sullivan, 2010).  The most 
concerning area is marked “Dangerous,” where the crew believes that they are on course 
when they are not.  This thesis focused on this type of misperception because it lends 








Struggling. No accurate 
fix, aware that aircraft is 
off track 
Dangerous. Lost and 




On course and lucky. 
Accurate fix, but not 
confident in navigation 
solution. 
Skilled performer. On track 
and certain. 
Table 1.   Matrix for Assessing Navigational Skills (After Sullivan, 2010).  We see 
that the most dangerous combination is low correctness and high 
confidence, and the pilots do not recognize the loss of situational awareness.  
Sullivan et al. (2010) collected navigation and eye scan pattern data from 12 
military officers who underwent an overland navigation simulation. This experiment had 
pilots navigate through 12 waypoints in a simulation terrain model of Twentynine Palms, 
CA. Regression analysis confirmed previous results that flight performance measures 
such as RMS (root-mean square) error were not predicted by the expertise level of pilots 
(Bellenkes, Wickens & Kramer 1997). However, Sullivan et al. (2010) found that gaze 
parameters and scan management skills were predicted by the expertise level. Most 
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relevant to this study, analysis through Flight and Eye Scan visualization Tool (FEST, 
Figure1) showed that some pilots had biased perception.  As shown in Figure 1, subject 
five missed a waypoint and started to track north of the intended route.  Instead of using 
available visual cues on the flight simulation screen or out-the-window (OTW) to realize 
that he was off course, he perceived that he was still on course.  This pattern suggests the 
pilot was using some biased visual cueing in which he overweighed OTW cues that fit 
into his perception that he was on course, and disregarded OTW cues that did not fit with 
his hypothesis.   
 
 
Figure 1.   Left: Flight and Eye Scan visualization Tool (FEST) and Right: Subject 
five’s actual flight trajectory (blue) and planned route (black) (right) 
(Sullivan et al. 2011 and Yang et al. 2011) 
Yang used data gathered from Sullivan’s experiment and classified pilot 
misperception into three types (Yang, Kennedy, Sullivan & Day, 2011).  Type one is 
confusion between inference and evidence.  This type is especially seen when the pilots 
have a high belief that they are on-track.  Type two is when pilots incorrectly assume 
mutually exclusive evidences based on a highly-likely visual cue for multiple locations.    
The third type is when pilots discount cues that do not correspond to their hypothesis.  
This misperception type can be attributed to inattentional blindness (Simons & Chabris, 




Perception type Posterior probability 
Bayesian agent (A)  ( | )   
 ( | )   ( )
 ( | )   ( )   ( |  )   (  )
 
Misperception Type 1 (B1)  ( | )    ( | )                               when  ( | ) ≈ 1 
Misperception Type 2 (B2) 
 ( | )   
 ( | )  ( )
 ( | )  ( ) (   ( | ))  (  )
 ( | )  
 ( | )  ( )
 ( | )  ( ) ( - ( | ))  (  )
        
when  ( | ) ≈ 1 
Misperception Type 3 (B3)  ( | )    ( )                                   when   ( | ) ≈ 0 
Table 2.   Visual misperception modeling using a Bayesian framework (From Yang et 
al., 2011); where d = terrain features that the pilot sees, and H = pilots 
current position 
Bayesian updating centers on the fact that subjective beliefs should be updated 
with the addition of some evidence.  Orbán claimed in his paper, “Bayesian Learning of 
Visual Chunks by Human Observers,” that humans act and learn as logical Bayesian 
agents even if they are unaware of this fact.  Humans are able to update conditional 
probabilities to make correct maximizing or minimizing choices in complex 
environments (Orbán, Fiser, Aslin & Lengyel, 2008).  For this type of Bayesian cognitive 
modeling, human errors are not considered.  These errors, to include misperception, are 
very important in determining why aviators get off track.  Knowing that a pilot is acting 
as Bayesian agent is not as useful as knowing why the pilot is not acting as a Bayesian 
agent.  When pilots are not acting as a Bayesian agent there is greater chance of them 
getting off-course. 
Inattentional blindness, or perceptual blindness, occurs when a person is 
overwhelmed with inputs causing them to miss a stimulus that is in plain sight.  Simons 
and Chabris (1999) demonstrated this phenomenon by showing a video of two groups of 
people passing a basketball to participants.  The participants were supposed to count the 
number of passes made in the video.  During this video a person dressed as a gorilla 
walks through the scene.  Fifty percent of the subjects tested did not notice the gorilla in 
the video.  Sullivan (2010)’s data showed the inattentional blindness.  The high cognitive 
workload experienced in helicopter low level navigation results in pilots focusing on 
certain inputs, for example gauges map, and terrain. However, they miss other inputs that 
an outsider could consider obvious.  After the fact, it is easy to show pilots that they 
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missed substantial terrain features, just as it was easy to show participants that they 
missed the gorilla in the video.  OTW gaze data showed the pilot “looked” at the terrain 
which is a cue for realizing that they are off-track.  However, they did not “perceive” the 
cue they were looking at.  During pilot training, students are instructed to refrain from 
fixating on one input and to keep their scan moving, yet this inattentional blindness is still 
observed. 
Another theory on why pilot misperception occurs is overestimation of personal 
ability or overconfidence.  Overconfidence leads pilots to perceive that they are on course 
even after they have drifted off course.  After drifting off course, pilots will try to match 
their outside surrounding to the map, and not the converse.  This overconfidence can be 
explained by Stone’s research of self-efficacy (Stone, 1994).  In this experiment, he 
placed subjects in complex cognitive tasks and observed their behavior, performance, and 
perceptions.  He found that the subjects were biased towards overestimates of personal 
ability; that is, they perceived their performance to be better than it actually was.  This 
finding seems counterintuitive, because one would believe that they would be less 
confident when they are engaged in high workload environment.  There can be two 
reasons for this overconfidence applied to navigation.  The first is that the aviator is so 
task overloaded that they rely too heavily on their navigation abilities and training.  Even 
if the pilot believes that they are getting behind on their navigation, they still believe that 
they are heading in the right direction because of previous good decisions and they do not 
have adequate time to get their precise location.  The second reason for overconfidence is 
due to a lack of knowledge of the current situation.  If a pilot has limited experience 
operating in a certain environment, they can be unaware of the dangers associated with it.  
An aviator who has never flown in the mountainous desert environment may apply 
incorrect navigational techniques assuming it will yield the same results.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 My thesis models the different types of visual misperception and validates these 
classifications by making comparisons between what pilots see OTW and their alleged 
location on the map to the actual flight trajectory and location through human-in-the-loop 
experiments. The thesis focused on three areas: (1)   Investigate correlation between 
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pilot’s perception and confidence.  (2) Provide misperception modeling in a Bayesian 
framework.  (3)  Given what we learn about pilot misconception, what training, 
operational or acquisition strategies should we recommend to the Navy to increase 
combat efficiency and decrease risks? 
 
D. OUTLINE OF THESIS 
Methods:  This section covers the reason for experimental design and 
experimental hypotheses.  This section also described the dependent and independent 
variables used and how they were collected.  Experimental setup and procedures also fall 
under this section. 
Analysis and Results:  This section includes how experimental data was filtered, 
grouped, and/or correlated.  The outputs of this analysis are presented. 
Model:  The model section includes model design, implementation, and output. 
Conclusions and Recommendations:  This section highlights and summarizes 
results from analysis and the model.  This section also provides recommendations based 
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II. SIMULATOR-BASED HUMAN-IN-THE-LOOP 
EXPERIMENTS 
A. EXPERIMENTAL HYPOTHESES 
  This section provides the reasoning for the experimental setup used to test initial 
hypotheses.  The goal of the experiment was to place a participant with navigation 
experience in a situation where only visual terrain cues were available for navigating.   
Four hypotheses were constructed that focused on participants’ perceived and actual 
location and self-assessed Figure of Merit, or confidence, during the visual navigation 
tasks.  These four hypotheses will be analyzed in the following chapters.   
The first null hypothesis is there no correlation between distance from actual 
helicopter position during pause points and the participant’s perceived location and the 
participant’s confidence of their perceived location.  This hypothesis is based on the idea 
that one’s confidence is not related to their navigation performance, or that one’s 
confidence may even increase with greater navigation error.  The alternative hypothesis 
was that there is a negative correlation between confidence and perception error.  This 
hypothesis states that if a participant perceived themselves to be “lost,” they would be 
able to recognize that fact and therefore have a corresponding low confidence level.  This 
hypothesis test can also be related to unrecognized special disorientation.  Unrecognized 
disorientation is considered the most dangerous of the three types of disorientation, and is 
when pilots are unable to correctly perceive what is happening in their surroundings.   
Failing to reject the null hypothesis for this case could be a causal factor for pilots getting 
off-track, along with the associated mishaps and mission failures. 
The second null hypothesis tested is no correlation between the pilot’s confidence 
and the distance between their perceived location and the intended route of flight.  This 
hypothesis claims that when a pilot believes that they are off the intended route of flight, 
there would not be a corresponding low confidence level. The alternate hypothesis is that 
there is a negative correlation between confidence and distance between perceived and 
actual course.  The reasoning behind this alternative hypothesis was because if a pilot 
was maintaining an accurate track and course, they would be close to the intended route.  
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Once a pilot believed that they have strayed off course, they would be more likely to be 
guessing at their current position.  Failing to reject the null could show that pilots have a 
biased confidence belief even when they are not tracking on course. 
The longer a participant navigates through an intended route, the greater the 
distance between the perceived location and the actual helicopter position was the third 
null hypothesis tested.  The reasoning behind this null hypothesis was because it would 
be assumed that the longer a pilot navigates through a scenario the more likely they 
would deviate from their intended course.  The causal factors for this could be because 
the participant has more time to stray off course, fatigue, or leg heading or timing was 
forgotten or not as fresh in the mind compared to earlier in the navigation route.  The 
alternative hypothesis was that there not an increase in distance between perceived and 
actual location the longer into the participant navigates.  Rejecting the null hypothesis 
would state that pilot misperception is not reliant on where on the route the aircraft is 
located. 
The final hypothesis that was tested was that confidence decreased the further into 
the navigation route, or confidence is a function of time.  The null hypothesis assumes 
that the confidence level of participant would reduce because of some causal factors.  
These factors could be because the pilot had more time to realize that they were off 
course, fatigue, or overtasked.  The alternative to the null is that confidence does not 
decrease the longer the participant was flying.  Results regarding this hypothesis would 
give insights into how pilots generate their confidence levels over a period of time. 
B. EXPERIMENTAL METHOD 
1. Task Definition 
Low level navigation, or “terrain flight” (TERF), is defined as flight below 200 
feet above ground level (AGL) (CNATRA P-458).  This environment is challenging 
because the low flight level reduces the amount of terrain that the pilot can see, and 
requires intense emphasis on flight parameters.   We focus on the navigation aspect of 
terrain flight; our simulated aircraft is held at constant altitude and does not experience 
emergencies – two critical dimensions of real-world TERF navigation.  “Proficient 
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navigation during low-level flight requires training and practice. Identifying [check 
points] (CPs) is the critical task, since this requires the navigator to be proficient in map 
reading, terrain interpretation, and correlation of terrain features with map symbols. He 
must be able to visualize from the map how the terrain along the flight path should look. 
He must also be able to look at the terrain, identify his location, and locate it on the map” 
(CNATRA P-458).  
Low-level VFR Navigation requires efficient visual scanning.   Visual scanning is 
the ability to recognize and reference key terrain features in a given field of view.  These 
key terrain features will allow the navigator to recognize waypoints and intermediate 
check points along the route.  Pilots must also “be prepared for the terrain to look 
differently than as planned and adjust as necessary” (CNATRA P-458).  
 2. Navigation Route Design 
The route environment and waypoint selection plays a large role in the outcome 
of this study.  The route needed to be in a location that did not favor any particular pilot’s 
previous Fleet experience and covered an area that had challenging terrain so that there 
was great possibility of misperceiving the surroundings.  Finally, it needed to be an area 
adequately mapped in FALCONVIEW to use in our analysis. The mountainous area of 
Twentynine Palms was selected for this experiment for several reasons.  The first being 
that the area includes some landmarks, and there are multitudes of executable routes.  
Secondly, most of the participants of the study have not operated in this area.  Finally, we 
consider the high altitude desert terrain to be comparable to the current operating 
environments in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
After choosing the operating area, routes were selected to support hypothesis 
testing.  To collect sufficient data, four routes were generated, along with a practice route.  
The participant had to navigate through the route using a joystick which controlled 
heading (roll) only; participants had no control over pitch, yaw, power, or airspeed.  The 
pilots did not have to control attitude, airspeed, rotor speed or ball, therefore greatly 
simplifying the navigational task.  For the last two routes, a scripted “autopilot” guided 
the participant along a set course without their control.  
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The autonavigation routes were added to normalize the experiment in the 
following manner:  If all of the participants were able to control the helicopter through 
the routes, each pilot would see different terrain features because the probability of two 
independent pilots flying the same course is practically zero.  Controlling the route with 
the autopilot allowed the experiment proctor to pause the route at the exact same points, 
so that each participant sees the same terrain.  More than this, it ensures that each pilot is 
presented the terrain identically – that they approach it from the same azimuth and roll 
angle. 
 With the number and types of routes chosen, the waypoints comprising the route 
were selected.  The routes needed to be fair, yet challenging enough for the pilots to get 
off-course.  We subjectively created routes that were appropriate for a late-first tour 
aviator’s level of experience.  
The practice route was designed to get the participant familiar with the control of 
the helicopter, feel comfortable using the confidence program, establish a scan pattern, 
and gain familiarity with the interfaces.  The practice route was a short, four-waypoint 
route.  This route was based off prominent landmarks, yet still required the pilot to make 
large heading changes.   
Figure 2 shows the intended path of the practice route.  The waypoints are the 
circles labeled one through four.  Adjacent to each leg is a navigational totem, 
colloquially referred to as a “doghouse,” oriented in the intended direction of flight.  The 
doghouse contains four pieces of navigational data.  On the top of the doghouse is the 
number of the next waypoint on the intended route.  Below the waypoint entry is the 
intended magnetic heading followed by the distance of the leg in nautical miles (nm).  
The last number on the doghouse is time it takes to fly the given leg traveling at 65 kts.  
“Doghouse” annotations were not provided to pilots during the execution of the test, only 
in the prior “map study.” 
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Figure 2.   Map of the practice route that participants used for map study.  This view 
shows waypoints 1–4, and the according ‘doghouses’ which give the pilot 
distance and timing information enroute.   
The first navigation route where data was collected was designed to ease the 
participants into the experiment.  Figure 3 shows the intended route of flight for the route.  
For each scenario the participants begin the route exactly on the first waypoint heading 
directly to the second waypoint.  Approaching waypoint two, there was terrain rising off 
the nose of the aircraft with a low level wash to the right.  After reaching waypoint two, 
participants had to make a 90-degree turn to the right across the wash to the entrance of a 
valley at waypoint 3.  The valley at waypoint 3 can be misperceived because there was 
similar valley that leads to the West abeam waypoint three.  Participants had to reference 
their heading to make sure that they are heading down the correct valley, or could also 
notice that they had to choose the valley furthest to the right.  The leg after waypoint 3 
follows the valley until it reaches a saddle in the terrain followed by a drop off indicating 
waypoint 4.  The route from waypoints 4 to 5 follow low level terrain to the furthest 
Northern tip of the higher terrain at waypoint 5.  Heading towards waypoint 6 there was a 
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large chance of misperceiving terrain if the participants were not using the available 
visual cues.  Along this leg, several valleys resemble the one at waypoint 6.  Participants 
had to realize that waypoint 6 is abeam a small hill.  Waypoint 7 also had a chance to be 
misperceived because of a lack of significant terrain in the area.  Participants had to be 
cognizant that once they cross a valley on the leg from 6 to 7, that waypoint 7 is just on 
the other side.  Also if participants miss waypoint 7 they have to recognize the limiting 
feature of the large flat landscape soon after waypoint 7.  Waypoint 8 should be easily 
recognized if the participant remained close to track because it is the only large hill with 
little terrain around it.  A subject matter expert believed that approximately half of the 
participants would be able to complete this route without any help from the proctor. 
 
Figure 3.   Map of navigation route 1.  This type of map was also used for map study.  
The features of this route that are noteworthy are that it follows easily 
marked valleys.  Also, note that there are no large heading changes. 
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The second navigation route was designed to task saturate the pilots to a level 
where they would stray off-course.  To achieve this, navigation legs passed through 
heavily mountainous terrain, making it hard for the pilots to maintain good navigational 
checkpoints.  This route also required turns in excess of 90 degrees.  These turns also 
made it hard for the pilots because it required them to continuously search for new 
landmarks along the route.  Figure 4 shows the intended route of flight for the second 
route.  In this route, waypoint 2 was identifiable because it intersects rising terrain in the 
first large valley.  The leg from 2 to 3 follows a valley up to a ridge at waypoint 3.  This 
ridgeline can be misperceived if the participant does not follow the track because of other 
similar high terrain in the area.  Misperception can then lead the participant to track down 
the wrong ridgeline to waypoint 4.  Waypoint 4 is also difficult to distinguish because of 
surrounding similar terrain.  Much of these misperception errors due to similar terrain 
were solved with the large North-South running valley which contains waypoint 5.  
Navigation from point 5 to 6 follows the valley and ends at the entrance to the valley at 
waypoint 6.  After waypoint 6 participants had to make a left hand turn to waypoint 7 at 
the entrance to a Northeast running valley.  Waypoint 7 can be easily misperceived 
because there is a similar Northeast running valley to the East of point 7.  Participants 
had to make sure that they took the first valley entrance and not the second.  Waypoint 8 
was also difficult due to other similar high terrain in the vicinity.  After hitting waypoint 
8 at the mountain peak, participants had to make a right hand turn to waypoint 9 to the 
East.  Waypoint 9 is located along a valley in low level terrain that has the possibility to 
be overlooked, but was limited by the flat terrain to the East of this point.  The leg from 9 
to 10 also could be misperceived by a similar adjacent valley to the East of it.  It was 
believed that only a small percentage of the participants would be able to track on-course 
throughout this route.   
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Figure 4.   Map of navigation route 2. Note the challenging turns throughout and 
potential for overflying WP 3 and 5 and similar valleys at WP 7 and 9 
The two autonavigation routes were based off the route used in Sullivan (2010) 
shown in Figure 5.  It was during this experiment that over half of the participants 
misperceived the valley A as waypoint 6, and a large number of participants had 
problems locating waypoint 9.  These autonavigation routes were designed in hopes of 
determining the reason why participants in Sullivan et al. (2010) did not realize they were 
off-course once they made their mistake. 
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Figure 5.   Map of the navigation routes used in Sullivan (2010). 
The first autonavigation route, Figure 6, consisted of waypoints 3 through 9 of the 
route from Sullivan et al. (2010).  The autonavigation flight path closely resembles what 
some of the participants flew in Sullivan’s experiment.  They went right by waypoint 4, 
and flew down the wrong valley, i.e., valley A.  Instead of realizing they were off course, 
A 
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they continued to fly, ending up to the North of the intended route. This thesis looks to 
understand why the participants were misperceiving this segment of the route. 
 
 
Figure 6.   Intended (black) and actual (yellow) first autonavigation route 
The second autonavigation route resembles the second half of Sullivan’s (2010) 
route (Figure 7).  The actual flight path of route also resembles what some of the 
participants of Sullivan’s (2010) experiment flew.  This flight path is considered very 
difficult to follow once the aircraft turns to the South after waypoint 4 because pilots are 




Figure 7.   Map of the second auto navigation route.  Intended (black) and actual 
(yellow) second autonavigation route 
 3. Performance Measures 
The measures collected in this experiment were classified into two categories, 
independent and dependent.  The independent variables were based on demographic and 
experience, while the dependent variables were navigation performance and confidence.  
a. Data Collection 
The best way to access navigation performance is to combine how 
accurately the participant navigated through the route and compare it to their confidence 
or perception (Sullivan, 2010).  Finding the accuracy of navigation is relatively easy to 
calculate, and was one of the measures used in Sullivan (2010).  On the opposite end of 
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the spectrum is confidence.  Confidence has considerably more variance than accuracy, 
and is difficult to measure a benchmark value.  It is likely that the participants would 
have a different baseline and range of confidence (Orbán, 2008).  The question is how to 
best measure a participant’s confidence.  Ideally, confidence assessments should be 
collected and updated constantly throughout the navigation route.  The participant could 
only really do this with verbal protocol.  The biggest challenge is that there is poor 
standardization between participants. Some people are more verbal than others, and it is 
common that people are less likely to say when they are wrong then when they are 
correct.  In addition, verbal protocol drops off when a participant is in a high cognitive 
workload.  For these reasons, Sullivan used post route questionnaires to determine 
confidence throughout the route.  The biggest problem with the post route questionnaire 
is that participants quickly forget their true confidence feelings after the fact, and are 
likely to reduce their confidence if they found themselves ultimately getting lost during 
the simulation. 
This experiment was meant to collect accurate confidence data during the 
navigation process without the disadvantages of verbal protocol or post route 
questionnaires.  One of the hurdles of collecting this data was to avoid interrupting the 
navigational flow for the participants.  This means that large breaks were minimized in 
order to gather the most realistic data.  Break times were reduced by integrating a user-
friendly confidence application.  The route was paused at 20 to 40 second intervals and 
the participant was asked to pinpoint their perceived location on the map and to assign a 
confidence measure to their perception.  Pause break times were also minimized by 
informing participants that the breaks were to analyze their stream of consciousness while 
navigating, and should take about five seconds and not more than ten seconds.  The break 
times were not to be used to readjust their position by getting additional time to look at 
the map and the OTW displays.   
b. Independent Variables 
Independent variables were collected from the background questionnaire 
that included demographics and expertise.  Total flight hours, overland flight hours, 
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participation in similar past experiments, and experience with low-level and desert low-
level navigation were used to group and rank the participants for analysis.  
c. Dependent Variables 
There were two major dependent variables used for analysis; confidence 
and the distance from the actual and perceived helicopter position.  Confidence was based 
on a zero to 100 percent scale.  The error in perceived location was derived from the great 
circle distance between the actual latitude and longitude position of the aircraft and the 
participant’s perceived latitude and longitude.  The following equation is used because of 
the Earth’s curvature (Gellert, Gottwald, Hellwich, Kästner & Küstner, 1989). 
 d  = arccos(sin φa  sin φp  +  cos φa  cos φp cos (χa – χp)) R 
where   d = Error distance (km) 
 R = Earth’s radius at the Twentynine Palms, CA area = 6372.8 km 
 φa = Latitude of the actual aircraft position in radians 
 φp = Latitude of the perceived aircraft position in radians 
 χa = Longitude of the actual aircraft position in radians 
 χp = Longitude of the perceived aircraft position in radians 
Euclidian distance would introduce errors, but would be acceptable 
because the distances involved in this study are minimal compared to the curvature of the 
Earth.   
 4. Apparatus 
a. Display 
The participants of the experiment had three different displays on two 
monitors.  The out-the-window display was located directly in front of the participant and 
is shown in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8.   Example of the out the window (OTW) view that the participants saw in the 
experiment. 
The map used for this experiment is the 1:50K topographical land map 
(TLM).  This type of map is used in the training commands for overland navigation, 
terminal area maps for operational missions, and orienteering.  This map is also a good fit 
for our experiment because the grids on the map are one kilometer in length, giving the 
participants a quick reference on distance; we believe that this is the map that many of 
our subjects would choose if they were able.  1:50K TLM also provides in-depth terrain 
elevation data.  Because cockpit map displays vary widely among the different helicopter 
platforms, this 1:50 TLM was used both in map study and during the simulation.  The 
map display did not have the doghouse information on it, as they would normally have 
when operating in theater, forcing the participant to visually navigate through the route, 
and use less emphasis on instrument navigation.  The cockpit instrument gauges were 
selected to resemble standard military gauges, giving the participants with prior aviation 
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experience a realistic environment, yet kept the instrument cluster simple enough for 
participants who have limited experience with these gauges.  Therefore, the experiment 
only used a constant running clock, heading indicator, barometric altimeter, and radar 
altimeter (note:  Altitude was fixed at 150’ AGL for the experiment).  Adding all of the 
instrument gauges may have made the experiment more realistic, but that could also give 
an advantage to aviators who have experience with that cockpit layout.  This simplified 
instrument cluster was adequate to complete the navigation routes, and was intended to 
be used as a backup rather than as the primary navigation tools. 
 
 
Figure 9.   Screen shot of the map and instrument cluster seen by the participants 
during the experiment.  No doghouses are provided during the experiment. 
b. Control 
As mentioned previously the PNAC is usually the one who is in charge of 
navigation.  The PNAC give verbal navigational commands to the PAC.  This brings 
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about the standardization issue for the experiment.  To limit the discrepancies of verbal 
communication, the participant would be required to navigate and fly for the first two 
routes.  To allow the participant to cover both of these tasks, the aviating task had to be 
simplified.  This simplification was achieved by using autopilot for altitude hold and 
constant airspeed.  This altitude was set to 150 feet AGL and airspeed was set to 65 kts.  
This means that the only required inputs into the simulation were left and right roll.  The 
roll was executed using a joystick resembling a helicopter cyclic.  Navigation using this 
joystick required a small workload, allowing the participant to concentrate on navigation 
and not pilotage. 
c. Flight Simulation 
The setup of equipment for the simulation involved a cockpit style seat 
with a joystick mounted in between the participant’s legs.  The joystick placement, look, 
and control are similar to a helicopter cyclic.  The joystick allowed the participant to roll 
the aircraft in the lateral direction and pitch (up and down) without corresponding 
changes in altitude and airspeed, and gave the participant the ability to look up and down.  
A computer mouse was mounted to the right side of the seat for the participant to 
pinpoint their location on the digital map and adjust their confidence.  Directly in front of 
the participant was the OTW monitor with a 110cm by 61cm display.  The OTW monitor 
was placed four feet from the s participant and covered a 65-degree field of view (FOV).  
At a 130 degree right offset towards the participant from the OTW display was an 88.5cm 
by 50cm display used for the map and instrument panel.  The display map was a 1:50K 
topographical land map (TLM), the same type as the participant s used for their map 
study.  On the map were labeled blue circles representing numbered waypoints.  The map 
was pointed North at all times because when the map moved automatically with the 
heading the aircraft it became very disorienting to the pilot.  The instrument panel 
contained a heading indicator that was typical of Navy H-60 displays.  Next to the 
heading indicator was a typical barometric altimeter followed by a radar altimeter.  
Above these gauges was a constant running digital-style elapsed time clock.  This clock 
started when the simulation program started and did not stop, even when the simulation 
was paused, until the route was finished.   
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Figure 10.   Schematic Diagram of Experiment Setup, Joystick input is read by X-Plane 
and initiates the Image Generator, which then displays the OTW, map, and 
instrument outputs to the participant and instructor.  
 
Figure 11.   Equipment layout showing the location of participant, instructor, displays, 
and software. 
The software used to run the simulation was Image Generator, Terrain & 
Map D8, and Data Logger by Delta3D and OpenSceneGraph.  These programs used 
inputs through X-Plane 9.21rc2, a commercially used flight simulator.  The software 
coverts the X-Plane data into the OTW and map views based on the participants inputs.  
The X-Plane model was set using the Fokker Eindecker E.I airframe with a modernized 
autopilot and GPS flying at 5,000 mean sea level (MSL) and 65 knots.  This airframe was 
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chosen because of its ability to fly at slow speeds and not stall.  The image generation PC 
takes the X-Plane position information but changes the altitude so that the participants 
see an altitude of 150 feet AGL.  This altitude remained fixed throughout the route and 
maintained obstacle clearance in the mountainous terrain.  Moving the joystick up and 
down did not affect the pitch of the aircraft, but did allow the participant to look up and 
down.  The roll of the aircraft was completed with left or right joystick inputs.  This put 
the aircraft in coordinated turns.  The software also updated the instruments to correspond 
with the current flight profile. 
The first two routes required participant roll inputs to navigate through the 
route, while the last two routes were flown on autopilot.  The autopilot was set in X-Plane 
to follow a preselected route.  The participant did not have roll control but had the ability 
to look up and down on the screen with forward and back control movement.  
d. Confidence Application 
Confidence App Software was created in order gain useful confidence 
output data.  This program allowed the participant to click where they perceived to be on 
the map display.  After the participant right clicked on the map, a red dot showed on the 
screen and a confidence scroll bar appeared.  This confidence bar allowed the participant 
to rate how confident they were of their perceived location.  This bar ranged from 100, 
very confident, to 0, very lost.  After the route was complete, the software also created a 
CSV file that contained the elapsed time of when the participant made his location 
estimate, the actual helicopter latitude and longitude, the participant’s estimated latitude 
and longitude, and the participant’s confidence on their perceived location. 
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Figure 12.   Snapshot of the Confidence App.  Red dot is the participant’s perceived 
location and confidence scroll bar from 0 to 100. 
 5. Procedures 
Participants were introduced to the experimentation lab with an IRB approved 
welcome script (Appendix) that notified the participant of the focus of the study, brief 
overview of what will be expected out of them, rules of the lab, and the voluntary nature 
of the study.  The participants were given an informed consent form, also listed in 
Appendix, to read and sign. The form reviewed the minimal risks, the voluntary nature, 
the benefits, and confidentiality of participating in this experiment.  After the informed 
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consent, the participant was given a questionnaire relating to their flying experience and 
background (Appendix).  The background questionnaire included basic demographics, 
familiarity of the simulation-operating environment, experience with overland navigation, 
flight hours, and time since last flight.  This data was collected to help group the 
participants for analysis. 
Once the participant completed the background questionnaire, they were given a 
familiarization of the experiment; including the flight parameters of the helicopter, what 
is contained on the video screens, joystick control, and how to use the confidence feature 
of the simulation.  Once the participant seemed comfortable with how the simulation 
would run, they were given a map of the practice route.  This was an 8x11 map printed 
from Falconview.  The map was a 1:50K TLM, just like the one that they would see on 
the monitor.  This map was doghoused, with the waypoint number, distance in nm, time 
to fly the leg, and total elapsed time.  This paper map was only allowed during the map 
study, and not during the flight portion of the simulation.  The participant could only use 
the map on the monitor, which included numbered waypoints, during the simulation.  The 
participants were given unlimited time to review the practice map before flying the 
simulation.  The practice simulation was four waypoints long on an easy route.  One of 
the main objectives of the practice route was to make the participant comfortable with the 
flight profile and monitor views, along with getting a solid grasp of using the confidence 
program.  This route was paused roughly every 30 seconds for the participant to point out 
their perceived location on the map, and their confidence level.  The participants were 
given some navigation assistance from the proctor if they were lost.  Once the participant 
completed the route, they were asked if they were comfortable with the simulation and 
programs.  If necessary they were allowed to have extra practice flying the helicopter if 
they were not comfortable. 
After the completion of the practice route, the participants were tasked with 
completing four navigation routes where data was collected.  In the first two routes, the 
participants were providing roll inputs while flying, whereas the last two routes were 
flown on autopilot.  The first two routes began with a map study period of three minutes, 
in contrast the last two map study times were two minutes.  Map study times were limited 
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to provide increased difficulty by limiting the amount of headings and timings on the 
route, and to keep the experiment under an hour in duration.  The last two map study 
times were less because the routes were shorter, and the helicopter was on 
autonavigation, reducing the task load on the participant.  Before executing the 
autonavigation route, the participants were also given a scenario.  In this scenario, the 
participant simulates flying with a new pilot in the squadron who is responsible for the 
navigating and flying.  Both the new pilot and the participant must fly in an area where 
they have never been.  The new pilot is supposed to follow the route, but there is a chance 
that they can get off-track.  The scenario informs the participant that the intended route is 
not necessarily what the new pilot will fly.  Once the map study was complete, the 
participant conducted the navigation portion of the simulation.  During the first two 
simulations, the route was paused about every 40 seconds.  40 seconds was not a hard 
number because the evaluator wanted to minimize pausing during turns. Pausing during 
turns can be disorienting to participants, and it is hard to remember the amount of bank 
they had after they finished the pause.  During the second two simulations, the pause 
points were in the same location for each participant, and happened between 20–40 
seconds.  Again, these pauses occurred during level flight.  After the completion of each 
of the navigation routes, the participants were given a post task questionnaire (Appendix).  
It questioned whether the participant felt they strayed off-course, misperceived terrain, 
and asked what they could have done differently to remain on-course. 
Once all four routes were completed, the participants were given one final 
questionnaire (Appendix).  This questionnaire covered topics on why they believe pilots 
get lost, what they do if they sense they are not on-course, and what they think their 
confidence level during navigation is.  This questionnaire allowed for participant 
grouping based off similar responses.  The participants were asked to add any additional 
comments, and the evaluator asked other pertinent questions to give insights on why they 
misperceived terrain on the route and confidence levels. 
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 6. Participants 
To participate in this experiment the participant needed to have overland 
navigation training.  Participants for this study were recruited from the Naval 
Postgraduate School student body and faculty.  Recruitment was completed through an 
IRB approved E-mail sent to Operations Research and Modeling, Virtual Environments 
and Simulation (MOVES) students.  In addition, recruitment was done through word of 
mouth and using past experiment participants. 
There were a total of 15 male and female participants ranging from 27 to 41 years 
of age, with an average of 36 years with a standard deviation of 4.8.  Total flight hours 
ranged from 0 to 2,500 with an average of 1,431 and a standard deviation of 803.5. Total 
overland hours ranged from 0 to 2,000 with an average of 870 and a standard deviation of 














III. ANALYSIS OF EXPERIMENTAL DATA 
A. VARIABLE DEFINITAION 
This section covers the variables that were used for data analysis and their 
definitions. 
1. Confidence (CONF) 
Pilots’ confidence was self-reported using the Confidence App, i.e., participants 
rated their navigation confidence from 0 to 1 for each pause point. The CONF is defined 
as confidence measurement between 0 and 1, where 0 indicates the lowest confidence and 
1 the highest confidence.  CONF_BIN is a variation of CONF coerced into a binary 
variable. The CONF_BIN is defined as 
CONF_BIN = High if CONF ≥ 0.5 
  Low if CONF < 0.5 
The threshold of 0.5 was chosen for the CONF_BIN variable because it was the 
numerical midpoint of the CONF range.  This midpoint was easily defined on the 
Confidence App, making it a likely division between high confidence and low 
confidence.  If a participant believed there was a good chance their perceived location is 
not close to the actual location they would not choose a confidence level over 0.5.  
2. Error (Correctness) 
To measure the navigation performance of the participant, error distance was 
solved.  This error distance was defined as the great circle distance (Gellert, 1989) from 
where the subject perceived they were compared to where they actually were during the 
pause points. 
ERROR1  = great circle distance between perceived and actual location in km 
= arccos(sin φa  sin φp  +  cos φa  cos φp cos (χa – χp)) R 
where   R = Earth’s radius at the Twentynine Palms, CA area = 6372.8 km 
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 φa = Latitude of the actual aircraft position in radians 
 φp = Latitude of the perceived aircraft position in radians 
 χa = Longitude of the actual aircraft position in radians 
 χp = Longitude of the perceived aircraft position in radians 
 
Similarly, the second type of error that was calculated was the distance between 
where the participant perceived they were compared to the intended route of flight. 
ERROR2      = great circle distance between perceived and planned location in km 
         = arccos(sin φi  sin φp  +  cos φi  cos φp cos (χi – χp)) R 
            where       R = Earth’s radius at the Twentynine Palms, CA area = 6372.8 km 
      φi = Latitude of the planned aircraft position in radians 
    φp = Latitude of the perceived aircraft position in radians 
     χi = Longitude of the planned aircraft position in radians 
    χp = Longitude of the perceived aircraft position in radians 
The next derived variable, NAV, took the ERROR1 distance and turned it into an 
indicator variable to state whether the participant stayed within a certain 
threshold/boundary. Pilots were instructed to stay within .5 km of the route; we buffered 
this to be .75 km. 
NAV = On-track if ERROR1 < 0.75 km 
 Off-track if ERROR1 ≥ 0.75 km 
The 0.75 km distance for obtaining the NAV variable was used because 
participants were told prior to their navigation tasks that they should be confident in their 
perceived location if they were within 0.5km of their actual location.  The 0.75 km gave 
the subjects an additional 0.25 km error distance because it is difficult for pilots to 
recognize if they fell within the 0.5 km distance while navigating.  This additional error 
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distance also helped to affirm, without any doubt, that the participant has the wrong 
perception of their location. 
3. Experience 
The study also conducted exploratory analysis on the effect of pilot experience.  
This analysis required defining variables for pilot flight hours, expertise, familiarity with 
low level desert navigation, and whether the subject participated in a similar past study 
and consequently may have experienced a practice effect.  These variables are shown 
below. 
EXPERTISE = Expert if participants total number of flight hours > 1,000 
  Novice if participants total number of flight hours ≤ 1,000 
PROFICIENT = Yes, if the participant answered Somewhat, Considerable, or 
Extensive for their experience with low level desert navigation  
     No if the participant answered Very Little or None 
PAT_EXP = Yes, if the subject participated in a similar past study 
       No, if they did not participate in a past study 
B. COMPREHENSIVE NAVIGATION PERFORMANCE 
The first analysis of the data related the experiment output to the Sullivan’s 
(2010) modified SDT matrix for assessing navigation skills (Table 1).  The experiment 
focused on the “dangerous” quadrant as defined in Chapter I; the pilot does not realize 
that they are lost.  Table 3 shows the confidence versus navigational error using the 



























Grand Total 14.65% 85.35% 100% 
Table 3.   Matrix of experimental navigation performance relating CONF_BIN and 
NAV.  Percentages in parentheses are calculated based on Off-track or On-
track NAV respectively. Of interest is the bolded area, corresponding to off 
track and high confidence, or the “dangerous” quadrant.   
Table 3 shows that 58.37% of the time during the navigation participants were 
On-track and had a corresponding high confidence level.  This table also shows that only 
6.98% of time pilots had low confidence yet still were considered On-track.  These 
percentages reflect that the subject is highly unlikely to misperceive their location when 
on-track, but the problem arises when the participants were Off-track. Subjects were off-
track, yet still highly confident 26.98% of the time during the navigation. This indicates 
subjects were highly confident about their navigation performance 77.86% of the time 
when they were off-track. The misperception error is about 3.5 times greater than correct 
perception when a pilot is off track.  This relates to the dangerous section of the matrix 
where pilots are lost and do not know it, and this is the second largest navigational state 
of the experiment among four navigational states.  It is also in this area where mission 
failure and mishaps occur due to incorrect navigation.  Figure 13 shows the breakdown of 




Figure 13.   Pie chart of comprehensive navigation performance matrix.  Notice Off-
track and High CONF is second highest performance state, and greater than 
40% of participants were away from ‘On track, high confidence,’ 
suggesting that overland navigation is a complex task. 
Table 3 is further broken down to see if different routes result in different 
perception output.  Table 4 compares the route and CONF_BIN and NAV. 
 
Assessing Navigation Performance 
Route   
1 2 3 4 Average 
NAV and 
CONF_BIN 














































Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 4.   Matrix of experimental navigation performance for each route comparing 
navigation performance and confidence. the auto navigation routes (3 and 4) 
had a lower percentage of route correctness, 73.5% and 71.7% for routes 1 
and 2 versus 64.4% and 65.2% for routes 3 and 4, respectively. 
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Table 4 shows that the confidence and correctness for each route align with the 
overall breakout.  The most interesting fact that Table 4 shows is that the auto navigation 
routes (3 and 4) had a lower percentage of route correctness, 73.5% and 71.7% for routes 
1 and 2 versus 64.4% and 65.2% for routes 3 and 4 respectively.  The participants 
misperceive their location more frequently when control inputs were not required from 
them.  Some explanations for this could be due to complacency, and/or experiment 
fatigue.  During the auto navigation routes, participants seemed to be more relaxed during 
the navigation and map study.  Participants were less likely to be actively tracking the 
course, which lead them to believe that the aircraft was heading on course.  This type of 
complacency is common in multi-piloted aircraft and can be attributed to mishaps.  Also 
noteworthy is the fact that route 3 had the highest percentage of time in the “dangerous” 
quadrant.  Order effects may explain why route 3 was higher than the other routes.  Route 
3 could be higher than route 1 and 2 because route 3 was the first time the participant 
dealt with autonavigation.  Additionally, route 3 could also be higher than route 4 
because they pilot realized at the end of route 3 that the autonavigation did not follow the 
intended route of flight, making the CONF on route 4 less than 3.  This would correspond 
to a lower amount of time in the “dangerous” quadrant. 
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C. HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
We used Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient to determine statistical 
dependence between variables for the first two hypothesis tests.  Spearman’s rank 
correlation is a nonparametric measure, and is commonly denoted as ρ (rho).  Spearman’s 
rank correlation coefficient is defined as Pearson’s correlation coefficient with ranked 














where di = the difference in rank between confidence and error distance 
n = the cumulative number of pause points examined for each route 
The significance level, α, was set at 0.05.  To avoid confusion, for the remainder 
of this paper, when we refer to  , we mean Spearman’s measure. 
1. Hypothesis 1: Navigation Error and Confidence is Negatively 
Correlated, i.e., as Navigation Error Increases, Corresponding 
Confidence Decreases. 
Hypothesis 1 was examined for each route.  The average CONF and ERROR1 
was computed for each route, and then these averages were tested for correlation.  Below 
are the null and alternative hypotheses. 
H01.1:  There is a positive or no correlation between CONF and ERROR1 for the 
first route, i.e., ρ1≥0 
Ha1.1:  There is a negative correlation between CONF and ERROR1 for the first 
route, i.e., ρ1<0 
 
H01.2:  There is a positive or no correlation between CONF and ERROR1 for the 
second route, i.e., ρ2≥0 
Ha1.2:  There is a negative correlation between CONF and ERROR1 for the second 
route, i.e., ρ2<0 
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H01.3:  There is a positive or no correlation between CONF and ERROR1 for the 
third route, i.e., ρ3≥0 
Ha1.3:  There is a negative correlation between CONF and ERROR1 for the third 
route, i.e., ρ3<0 
 
H01.4:  There is a positive or no correlation between CONF and ERROR1 for the 
fourth route, i.e., ρ4≥0 
Ha1.4:  There is a negative correlation between CONF and ERROR1 for the fourth 
route, i.e., ρ4<0 
 
Table 5 shows Spearman’s rank correlation for each route. 
ρ1 ρ2 ρ3 ρ4 
-0.150 0.158 0.036 -0.354 
Table 5.   Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient relating CONF and ERROR1 for 
each route.  Notice that there are not statistically significant values (all p-
values > 0.1) 
Using a one-tailed test of Student’s t distribution at α = 0.05 level, we fail to reject 
H01, H02, H03, and H04.  Thus, we cannot claim that navigation error and confidence is 
negatively correlated for routes 1 through 4.  This is a surprising result.  One would think 
that there should be a high correlation between confidence and perceived location.   
This result has several implications to real world navigation.  When a pilot is 
confident in their location, it does not necessarily mean that they on course.    Knowledge 
of this fact could help reduce the amount of complacency of the crewmembers who are 




pilot.  They might reduce their confidence level that they are on track causing them to be 
more proactive in the cockpit and help notice potential dangers if they are not following 
the route correctly. 
 
Figure 15.   CONF versus ERROR1 for each route.  Note there looks to be little 
correlation between the variables. 
 
2. Hypothesis 2:  Distance Between Perceived Location and Intended 
Route is Negatively Correlated to Confidence, i.e., as the Distance 
Between the Perceived Location and Intended Route Increases, 
Corresponding Confidence Decreases. 
H02.1:  There is a positive or no correlation between CONF and ERROR2 for the 








































































Ha2.1:  There is a negative correlation between CONF and ERROR2 for the first 
route, i.e., ρ1<0 
 
H02.2:  There is a positive or no correlation between CONF and ERROR2 for the 
second route, i.e., ρ2≥0 
Ha2.2:  There is a negative correlation between CONF and ERROR2 for the second 
route, i.e., ρ2<0 
 
H02.3:  There is a positive or no correlation between CONF and ERROR2 for the 
third route, i.e., ρ3≥0 
Ha2.3:  There is a negative correlation between CONF and ERROR2 for the third 
route, i.e., ρ3<0 
 
H02.4:  There is a positive or no correlation between CONF and ERROR2 for the 
fourth route, i.e., ρ4≥0 
Ha2.4:  There is a negative correlation between CONF and ERROR2 for the fourth 
route, i.e., ρ4<0 
 
Table 6 shows Spearman’s rank correlation for each route. 
ρ1 ρ2 ρ3 ρ4 
-0.650* -0.266 0.011 -0.596* 
† p<.10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Table 6.   Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient relating CONF and ERROR2 for 
each route 
Using a one-tailed test of Student’s t distribution at α = 0.05 level, we reject H01 
and H04.  Thus, we can claim that the distance between perceived location and intended 
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route and confidence is negatively correlated for routes 1 and 4.  This means that the 
participant has high confidence when they believe they are close to the intended route for 
routes 1 and 4 regardless of their actual closeness.  This result shows that there is 
evidence of biased visual perception favoring their intended location.   
 
Figure 16.   CONF versus ERROR2 for each route.  There looks to be some correlation 
between the variables. 
Adding to the ERROR2 and CONF correlation Table 7 shows the average 
ERROR1 and ERROR2 distance for each route. 
Route Avg ERROR1 Avg ERROR2 % Difference 
1 0.5304 0.1311 404.58% 
2 0.6337 0.1805 351.08% 
3 0.7411 0.2525 293.50% 








































































Table 7.   Average ERROR1 and ERROR2 for each route and the percent difference 
in the averages. 
 
Figure 17.   Column graph showing the difference between ERROR1 and ERROR2 
Table 7 and Figure 17 show how the participants were biased towards the 
intended route of flight.  ERROR1 was about three and a half times larger than the 
corresponding ERROR2.  Completing a paired t-test between ERROR1 and ERROR2, 
results in a t-stat of 11.4 and a corresponding p-value of p < 0.001.  This means that when 
confused, pilots had a tendency to perceive they were where they were supposed to be, 
and not defaulting to being further off track than they actually are.  This result is again 
helpful for pilots, because if they know that there is tendency to overestimate their 
navigational skills, they might reduce their estimation and corresponding confidence. 
 
3. Hypothesis 3: Perception Error Increases the Longer the Participant 
Navigates, i.e., the Distance Between Perceived Location and Actual 
Location is Larger at the End of the Route Compared to the 
Beginning. 
H03.1:  ERROR1 at the end of the route for the first route is smaller or equal to 




























Ha3.1:   ERROR1 at the end of the route for the first route is larger than ERROR1 
at the beginning of route one. 
 
H03.2:  ERROR1 at the end of the route for the first route is smaller or equal to 
ERROR1 at the beginning of route two. 
Ha3.2:   ERROR1 at the end of the route for the first route is larger than ERROR1 
at the beginning of route two. 
 
H03.3:  ERROR1 at the end of the route for the first route is smaller or equal to 
ERROR1 at the beginning of route three. 
Ha3.3:   ERROR1 at the end of the route for the first route is larger than ERROR1 
at the beginning of route three. 
 
H03.4:  ERROR1 at the end of the route for the first route is smaller or equal to 
ERROR1 at the beginning of route four. 
Ha3.4:   ERROR1 at the end of the route for the first route is larger than ERROR1 
at the beginning of route four. 
 
 

















† p<.10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Table 8.   t- statistics comparing ERROR1 in the beginning of the route and ERROR1 
at the end of the route for each route. α = 0.05 We reject the null hypothesis 
in each case, showing that ERROR1 increased at the end of the route. 
Table 8 supports the hypothesis that there is a statistically significant difference in 
ERROR1 at the beginning of the route and ERROR1 at the end of the route.  This 
suggests that perception error gets larger the longer the participant flies.  This result can 
help pilots realize that they might want to reevaluate their perceived location the further 
along the route they are, and reduce their corresponding confidence in their location. 
4. Hypothesis 4: Confidence Decreases the Longer the Participant 
Navigates, i.e., the Participants Confidence Level is Larger at the 
Beginning of the Route Compared to the End. 
H04.1:  CONF at the end of the route for the first route is smaller or equal to CONF 
at the beginning of route one. 
Ha4.1:   CONF at the end of the route for the first route is larger than CONF at the 
beginning of route one. 
 
H04.2:  CONF at the end of the route for the first route is smaller or equal to CONF 
at the beginning of route two. 
Ha4.2:   CONF at the end of the route for the first route is larger than CONF at the 
beginning of route two. 
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H04.3:  CONF at the end of the route for the first route is smaller or equal to CONF 
at the beginning of route three. 
Ha4.3:   CONF at the end of the route for the first route is larger than CONF at the 
beginning of route three. 
 
H04.4:  CONF at the end of the route for the first route is smaller or equal to CONF 
at the beginning of route four. 
Ha4.4:   CONF at the end of the route for the first route is larger than CONF at the 
beginning of route four. 
 
Table 9 shows the t-test for each route. 
 









† p<.10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Table 9.   Student t test relating CONF in the beginning of the route and CONF at the 
end of the route for each route. α = 0.05 
Table 9 supports the hypothesis that there is a statistically significant difference in 
CONF at the beginning of the route and CONF at the end of the route.  This suggest that 
the longer the participant navigates along a route, their corresponding confidence gets 
lower.  This result follows along with hypothesis 3, that the perceived error appears to 
increase the longer the participant navigates.  Pilots CONF is reducing with an increasing 
ERROR1.  Although there is no correlation between CONF and ERROR1, there is a 
trending effect of CONF getting lower further into the route while ERROR1 is 
increasing. 
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D. EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS ON EXPERTISE EFFECT 
Analysis was done to see if there was any effect on the results due to experience.  
This experience was broken down into two categories: expertise effect and learning 
effect.  
1. Expertise Effect 
To check the difference between expert and novice pilots, analysis comparing the 
effect of total flight hours (EXPERTISE) and low-level desert navigation experience 
(PROFICIENT). 
a. EXPERTISE (Total Flight Hours) 
CONF, ERROR1, and ERROR2 were analyzed for EXPERTISE on each 
route.  The experiment included 11 Expert and 4 Novice participants.  Figure 18 shows 





Figure 18.   EXPERTISE effect on CONF, ERROR1, and ERROR2 for each route.  
Error bars are for a 95% confidence level. 
Figure 18 shows that there is overlap in confidence levels for every 
variable on every route.  This means that EXPERTISE does not have an effect on CONF, 
ERROR1 and ERROR2.  To further examine the relationship between EXPERTISE and 
the variables, Student t tests between expert and novice were conducted for each route 













































  Route 
   1 2 3 4 
CONF 
t3 0.363 -0.0195 -0.111 0.141 
p-value 0.735 0.986 0.917 0.895 
ERROR1 
t3 -0.816 -0.0898 0.547 -0.383 
p-value 0.475 0.932 0.608 0.727 
ERROR2 
t3 1.34 -0.538 -1.169 -0.870 
p-value 0.203 0.610 0.327 0.433 
† p<.10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Table 10.   Student t test on EXPERTISE for CONF, ERROR1, and ERROR2 for each 
route.  We do not reject the null hypothesis in any case here, suggesting the 
EXPERTISE does not have an effect on the experiment. 
Table 10 shows that there is no statistically significant correlation on 
EXPERTISE.  This also means that there is also no effect on Expertise for the experiment 
using t-tests. 
The final check to see if EXPERTISE had an effect on the data was to see 
if Experts and Novices were in the “dangerous” quadrant for a similar amount of time.  
Table 11 shows the matrix breakdown of EXPERTISE. 
 
NAV/CONF_BIN Expert Novice  Average 
On-track 63.61% 70.18% 65.35% 
High 58.54% 48.25% 55.81% 
Low 5.06% 21.93% 9.53% 
Off-track 36.39% 29.82% 34.65% 
High 28.16% 23.68% 26.98% 
Low 8.23% 6.14% 7.67% 
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Table 11.   Participant navigation performance matrix based on EXPERTISE.  The 
highlighted portion shows that Expert and Novice participants were in the 
“dangerous” quadrant a similar amount of time 
Table 11 shows that Experts were actually in the “dangerous” quadrant 
more than the Novice pilots, yet both were fairly close.  This result is surprising, and can 
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again be helpful for crew coordination purposes.  Although a pilot may have a lot of 
flight hours, it does not mean that their perception is better than Novice pilots. 
b. PROFICIENT (Experience with Low-Level Desert Navigation) 
Analysis on the effect of PROFICIENT was examined just as 
EXPERTISE.  This analysis looks to show if there is any correlation between pilots who 
have experience with low-level desert navigation and those who have very little to none.  
There were seven participants who were PROFICIENT and eight who were not.  Figure 
19 shows the average breakdown of CONF, ERROR1 and ERROR2 for each route based 
on PROFICIENT. 
 
Figure 19.   Column graphs of PROFICIENT and average CONF, ERROR1, and 
ERROR2 for each route.  Error bars are based on 95% confidence level. 
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Figure 19 shows that there is overlap in confidence levels for all three 
variables for each route except for CONF on route 1.  This shows that PROFICIENT has 
little effect on participant’s experimental performance.  To further look into the effect of 
PROFICIENT Student t tests were completed and shown in Table 12. 
 
 
  Route 
   1 2 3 4 
CONF 
t7 -1.611 -0.772 -0.808 -1.134 
p-value 0.146 0.462 0.442 0.289 
ERROR1 
t7 1.785 0.577 -0.985 -1.106 
p-value 0.0976† 0.574 0.344 0.292 
ERROR2 
t7 2.675 1.180 0.637 -0.674 
p-value 0.0191* 0.261 0.536 0.513 
† p<.10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Table 12.   Student t-test for the correlation between PROFICIENT for CONF, 
ERROR1, and ERROR2 for each route. 
Table 12 shows that there is little statistically significant differences 
between PROFICIENT pilots.  Although not significant, it is interesting to note that for 
every route, CONF was lower for pilots who were PROFICIENT.  This may at first seem 
a little counterintuitive, because one would think that they would be more confident with 
their abilities. However, they could have been less confident because they know how 
easy it is to misperceive terrain in the desert environment.  The only statistically 
significant difference is ERROR2 for route 1.  This could show that PROFICIENT pilots 
had less bias to the intended route of flight for route 1.  Because this is the only 
significant result, and that ERROR2 is not significant for the other routes (ERROR2 is 
actually higher for PROFICIENT pilots in route 4), PROFICIENT no effect on this 
experiment.  
PROFICIENT was then checked to see if it had a correlation effect on the 
“dangerous” quadrant of the performance matrix.  Table 13 shows the performance 






CONF_BIN Yes No  Total 
On-track 65.83% 64.94% 65.35% 
High 49.25% 61.47% 55.81% 
Low 16.58% 3.46% 9.53% 
Off-track 34.17% 35.06% 34.65% 
High 22.61% 30.74% 26.98% 
Low 11.56% 4.33% 7.67% 
 Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Table 13.   Experimental performance matrix based on PROFICIENT 
Table 13 shows that there is a significant difference between the 
PROFICIENT and the “dangerous” quadrant of the performance matrix.  This again goes 
back to the findings that the PROFICIENT pilots were on average less confident than 
non-PROFICIENT pilots.  Both PROFICIENT and non-PROFICIENT were off track 
about the same amount of time, but the PROFICIENT pilots were able to adjust their 
confidence better than non-PROFICIENT.  Although PROFICIENT pilots were in the 
“dangerous” category less often, 22.61% compared to 30.74%, they were also less 
confident when they were on course compared to non-PROFICIENT.  Non-
PROFICIENT pilots had correct perception (NAV On-track and High CONF, NAV Off-
track and Low CONF) 65.8% of the time while PROFICIENT pilots had correct 
perception only 60% of the time.  This shows that PROFICIENT pilots were less 
confident during the routes, but enough to be statistically significant.  This led to the fact 
that differences in the performance matrix exist. 
E. LEARNING EFFECTS OF EXPERIMENTS 
1. Learning Effect (Past Experiment Participants vs. First Timers) 
This experiment had three participants who had previously conducted a similar 
experiment.  These participants could have a learning effect because they had already 
seen a similar OTW view and controlled a simulated aircraft. These participants had seen 
Sullivan’s (2010) route, so they could have an advantage over other participants during 
the two autonavigation routes that were based off Sullivan’s (2010) route.  Analysis was 
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conducted to see if these three participants skewed the data.  Figure 20 shows the average 
breakdown of CONF, ERROR1, and ERROR2 based off of PAST_EXP. 
 
 
Figure 20.   Comparative column graphs of CONF, ERROR1, and ERROR2 based on 
PAST_EXP for each route.  Error bars are for 95% confidence level. 
Figure 20 shows that the 95% confidence level bars overlap for each variable and 
each route except for CONF and ERROR2 on route 2.  This shows that there does not 


























































experiment.  Figure 20 does show that those who have completed prior experiments had 
higher CONF and lower ERROR1.  To see if these differences are significant, Student t 
tests were conducted and shown in Table 14. 
 
 
  Route 
   1 2 3 4 
CONF 
t2 1.292 2.289 0.922 0.902 
p-value 0.266 0.0620† 0.408 0.402 
ERROR1 
t2 -1.476 -0.486 -0.153 -1.519 
p-value 0.236 0.652 0.887 0.155 
ERROR2 
t2 -0.592 -3.026 0.135 -2.092 
p-value 0.596 0.0105* 0.901 0.0566† 
† p<.10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Table 14.   Student t tests comparing PAST_EXP for CONF, ERROR1, and ERROR2 
on each route. 
Table 14 shows that there is little statistically significant differences in the data 
except for ERROR2 for route 2.  ERROR2 significance shows that the participants with 
PAST_EXP actually had more bias in their navigation.  Otherwise, PAST_EXP had no 




 NAV/ CONF_BIN Yes No Total 
On-track 73.56% 63.27% 65.35% 
   High 66.67% 53.06% 55.81% 
   Low 6.90% 10.20% 9.53% 
Off-track 26.44% 36.73% 34.65% 
   High 24.14% 27.70% 26.98% 
   Low 2.30% 9.04% 7.67% 
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Table 15.   Experimental performance matrix based on PAST_EXP.  The Highlighted 
portion suggests that participants who conducted in a past experiment were 
in the “dangerous” quadrant a similar amount of time as those who did not. 
As Table 15 shows, PAST_EXP participants spent a higher percentage of time 
On-track, but they had about the same percentage in the “dangerous” quadrant of the 
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matrix.  This means that when they were Off-track they still believed they were tracking 
on-course.  This shows that PAST_EXP participants did not skew the analysis of pilots in 
the “dangerous” quadrant, meaning that PAST_EXP does not have a large effect on the 
data.  There are some minor differences, but they do not detract from the conclusions of 
the study. 
2. Between Scenario Differences 
This section investigates if there is a learning effect during the course of the 
experiment.  Paired t-tests were solved for CONF, ERROR1, and ERROR2 for each of 
the routes, and shown in matrix format in Tables 16 through 18. 
 
 
CONF  t14, 0.05 
   Routes 1 2 3 4 
1 ---       
2 
2.603 






0.00281** ---   




† p<.10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Table 16.   T-test matrix on the learning effect of CONF and route 
Table 16 shows that there was statistically significantly different CONF between 
some of the routes.  The cart shows that route 1 and route 4 had similar CONF data while 
routes 2 and 3 had similar data.  The difference in CONF is not too surprising, because 
the routes were set up to have varying difficulties.  Route 1 was supposed to be harder 
than route 2, causing the CONF to be lower in route 2 than route 1.  With a harder route, 
there are more chances for the participant to get off-track, thereby reducing their CONF 
level.  Route 3 and 4 were set up to be similar, but there is a large difference in the data.  
The participants’ realization at the end of route 3 that the autopilot did not follow the 
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intended route may have caused the difference.  This caused the participant to be less 
confident in the location of route 4.  The data shows that there was not a trending effect 
of increased or reduced confidence throughout the experiment.  
 
 
ERROR1  t14, 0.05 
   Routes 1 2 3 4 
1 ---       
2 -1.718 ---     
3 
-2.622 
p-value 0.0201* -1.629 ---   
4 -1.620 -0.408 0.199 --- 
† p<.10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Table 17.   Correlation matrix on the learning effect of ERROR1 and route 
Table 17 shows the surprising result of the limited effect that the routes had on 
ERROR1.  Participants had similar perception errors on all of the routes. 
 
 
ERROR2  t14, 0.05 
   
Routes 1 2 3 4 
1 1       
2 -1.494 1     
3 
-1.887 
p-value 0.0800† -1.341 1   
4 -1.544 -0.722 0.677 1 
† p<.10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Table 18.   Correlation matrix on the learning effect of ERROR2 and route 
Table 18 shows limited statistical significance that the route had on ERROR2.  
The participants had a similar bias to the intended route for every route. 
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F. POWER ANALYSIS 
The power of a statistical test is the probability that the test will reject the null 
hypothesis when the null hypothesis is actually false, or commonly, the probability of not 
committing a Type II error.  The power analysis will conclude if the experimental sample 
size was large enough to give significant results. 
Power analysis was conducted for the significant correlation coefficients for 
routes 1 and 4 of hypothesis 2.  This analysis was for a one-sided less than test with 
sample size of 15 and an alpha of 0.05.  ρ values of -0.65 and -0.596 correlate to a power 
of 0.858 and 0.776 respectfully.  The test will successfully reject the null hypothesis 
when the null hypothesis is actually false 85.8% for route 1 and 77.6% for route 4.  This 
power is high considering the small sample size of the experiment, meaning that pilot 
bias toward the intended route is likely (Cohen, 1988). 
G. POST TASK QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS 
At the completion of the navigation and debriefing portion of the experiment, the 
participants were given a Post Task Questionnaire (Appendix).  This questionnaire was 
written to answer two questions.  The first was to obtain navigation techniques that the 
more successful pilots used, while the later was an attempt to normalize CONF levels.  In 
the attempt to normalize the CONF levels, some interesting outcomes arose.  The first 
being that only one participant felt that pilots were not over reliant on navigation 
equipment like GPS, with six neutral responses and eight positive.  The second result of 
the questionnaire is that 12 of the 15 participants thought that it was easy to misinterpret 
terrain during overland navigation, with the other three responses being neutral.  The last 
questionnaire output was the most interesting.  Only two participants (13.3%) believe that 
they are overconfident in their navigation skills.  This is surprising considering the 
percentage of time the participants were in the “dangerous” quadrant of flight.  When the 
participant was Off-track, they had a high confidence, or wrong perception.  This 
suggests that pilots are misperceiving their overconfidence during navigation. 
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H. SUMMARY 
The results of the experiment showed that participants spent 27% of the time in 
the “dangerous” quadrant of the performance matrix, second only to On-track and High 
CONF.  It also showed that participants spent a higher percentage of time in the 
“dangerous” quadrant for the autonavigation routes.  The next data result was that there 
was no correlation between EEROR1 and confidence, yet there was correlation between 
ERROR2 and confidence.  This means that participant’s confidence did not decrease 
when perception error increased, but confidence did decrease when the perceived 
distance from the route increased.  Analysis was then conducted to see in CONF and 
ERROR1 changed with navigation duration.  CONF decreased and ERROR1 increased 
the longer into the route the participant was.  Lastly exploratory analysis was conducted 
to see if there was an experience or learning effect on the experiment.  Data showed that 
EXPERTISE and PROFICIENT had little effect on the experiment.  Analysis also 
showed that participants who completed similar experiments did not skew the data.  
Lastly analysis showed that there was some statistically significant differences in CONF 
between each route, but these differences could be explained with the different route 
complexities, but ERROR1 and ERROR2 had little difference between routes. 
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IV. MODELING MISPERCEPTION IN BAYESIAN 
FRAMEWORK 
This section provides the insights gained by modeling pilot misperception in a 
Bayesian framework.  The model classifies misperception categories, and determines 
when pilots are likely to fall into these categories during overland navigation.  
A. BAYESIAN MODELING OF MISPERCEPTION 
 Table 2 is an overview of the Bayesian misperception modeling for overland 
navigation from Yang et al. (2011).  Overland navigation requires the pilot to estimate 
their location over the ground given the outside terrain features presented to them.  To 
model this, two variables are defined and shown in Figure 21. 
                                
Figure 21.   Bayesian misperception model variables.  d is data, which includes the 
OTW visual cues or terrain features.  H is the location of the aircraft over 
the ground. 
 In this model, pilots are required to estimate p(H|d), where H is the location or 
orientation of the aircraft, and d is the data or visual cue that the pilot receives OTW.  
Then, p(H|d) the probability of a pilot’s current location being at H  after seeing a visual 
d cue can be obtained by applying Bayes’ rule: 
   
( | )* ( )
( | )
( | )* ( ) ( |~ )* (~ )
p d H p H
p H d
p d H p H p d H p H

                      (1) 
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 In equation (1),  p(H) is the prior probability, i.e., the pilot’s belief probability that 
they are at location H before seeing scene d.  p(d|H) is the conditional probability that the 
pilot sees d from OTW when they are at location H, while p(d|~H) is the conditional 
probability that the pilot sees d OTW when they are in a different location, (~H).  
Therefore, p(~H) is equal to 1- p(H), or the probability the pilot is not at location H. 
 The first misperception type is when pilots take the map data and try to fit it into 
what they see OTW.  This suggests that they are estimating p(H|d) as p(d|H),confusing 
inference with evidence.  This misperception is prevalent when the pilot believes they are 
on-track, and scene d is likely, or p(d|H) ≈ 1.  The pilot will then estimates p(H|d) is 
p(d|H) ≈ 1, which incorrectly overestimates the probability.  This approximation is 
incorrect and leads the pilot to view OTW scenes in a biased manner and to be 
overconfident. 
A second type of misperception occurs when pilots assume that the terrain that 
they see cannot look like terrain in a similar area.  They are assuming mutually exclusive 
events from evidence, or p(d|~H) = 1 – p(d|H).  This assumption is incorrect because 
some areas can have very similar terrain to other areas causing a similar visual cue (e.g., 
a hill or valley), that can be observed at different locations p(d|H) = p(d|~H).  Pilots 
acting under this misperception show a bias to where they perceive they are on the map 
and do not consider that the location they see out the map could be another spot on the 
map, or ~H.  This misperception is shown in the equation (2),  
  ( | )   
 ( | )  ( )
 ( | )  ( ) (   ( | ))  (  )
 (2) 
The third misperception type is when pilots disregard visual cues that do not fit 
into their current belief.  Pilots will also only use visual cues that are compatible with 
their current perceived location.  This means that pilots estimate p(H|d) to equal the prior 
probability p(H).  Not only are pilots disregarding visual cues, they are only accepting 
visual cues that support their perception.  This misperception type can be attributed to 
Inattentional Blindness (Simons & Chabris, 1999).  
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B. NAVIGATION PERFORMANCE AND CONFIDENCE COMPARISON 
In this section, an illustrative case study is made of two subjects’ navigation 
performances.  Route 3 was chosen for this comparison because the autonavigation 
allows for the pause points to be in the exact same location, and the participants have the 
same OTW view.  This comparison focuses on pause points 3 through 6, the valley that 
nine of the 12 participants missed in Sullivan (2010).  Participant 3 was chosen because 
they showed correct perception during the navigation, while Participant 5 had incorrect 
perception.  Both of these participants were helicopter pilots with over 1,000 total flight 
hours and neither had participated in a previous experiment.  Figure 22 shows Participant 
3 and 5’s navigation performance for route 3. 
 
        
Figure 22.   Route 3 data for Participants 3 and 5.  Black line is the intended route of 
flight, yellow line is the auto-pilot flight path, red star is perceived aircraft 
location with pause point number and confidence label, and blue circles are 
actual aircraft location with pause point label.  Notice Participant 3 has 
correct perception while Participant 5 believes aircraft followed intended 
route. 
Figure 22 shows the misperception of Participant 5 versus Participant 3.  
Participant 3 was able to realize that the auto-pilot did not follow the intended route, and 
the perceived and actual location was close.  Conversely, Participant 5 did not realize that 
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the aircraft deviated from the intend course.  This caused Participant 5 to still perceive the 
aircraft’s location on the intended route, as can be seen with the red stars close to the 
black line.  Figure 23 and Table 19 gives the breakdown of CONF, ERROR1, and 
ERROR2 for Participants 3 and 5. 
 
Figure 23.   Comparative column graphs that show the differences in CONF, ERROR1, 
and ERROR2 for Participants 3 and 5.  Notice the similar CONF but large 
differences in ERROR1 and ERROR2. 













3 0.73 0.3333 0.1171 3 0.84 0.2669 0.0606 
4 0.75 0.0890 0.8327 4 0.85 0.5123 0.3284 























































6 0.76 0.2775 1.0330 6 0.69 1.6466 0.0121 
 
Table 19.   CONF, ERROR1, and ERROR2 for subjects 3 and 5 during route 3.  Notice 
the lower CONF and ERROR1 and higher ERROR2 for subject 3.  
Table 19 shows the difference of CONF, ERROR1 and ERROR2 between 
Participants 3 and 5.  Participant 3 had lower CONF for two of the four pause points than 
Participant 5 even though they had better perception, or lower ERROR1.  This outcome is 
explained by our previous findings under hypothesis 1, that there is no correlation 
between CONF and ERROR1.  Participant 3 also has a much larger ERROR2 than 
Participant 5.  A larger ERROR2 is better for this area of the route because the auto-pilot 
is not following the intended route.  By having a relatively low ERROR2, Participant 5 
shows a bias towards the intended route.  This bias will be critical in determining the 
misperception types experienced by the participant. 
 The next step in modeling the misperception of participants is to look at the route 
and find key terrain features that participants can use to determine their location.  Figure 
24 shows key terrain of route 3. 
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Figure 24.   Key terrain features of route 3.  These terrain features should have been 
used by the participants to determine their position. 
The key terrain features in Figure 24 could be used as a guide to notify the 
participant that the autonavigation is not following the intended route of flight.  After 
passing WP 3, the participant should notice two hills off the right side of the aircraft (3. 
and 5. on Figure 24).  The participant needs to turn left into the valley at WP 4 after 
passing the first hill, and should have realized that they have gone too far if they pass the 
second hill.  The valley at WP 4 is also the first valley to the left after WP 3.  This valley 
is narrow and it has rising terrain after WP 5.  The valley through which the autopilot 
guides the participant is wide, and has a small mound in the middle (7. on Figure 24).  
This valley does not have any rising terrain and continues to another large, low-level 
open area.  Key terrain 9, on Figure 24 is a mountainous area and not the valley that one 
would expect to see at WP 6. 
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C. MISPERCEPTION SIMULATION 
In this section Participant 5’s route 3 navigation from WPs 3 through 7, or pause 
points 3 through 6, are analyzed and modeled.  Starting at pause point 3, participant 5 
showed correct perception, following the autonavigation of the aircraft.  It is at pause 
point 4 where Participant 5 fell into one of the misperception types.  At pause point 4, the 
aircraft was turning into a valley to the North of the intended route.  At this pause point, 
the aircraft was in terrain that was similar to WP 4, turning into an East to West valley.  
This can be described as p(d|H) ≈ p(d|~H), where d = valley and H = WP 4.  In order to 
have correct perception at this point, the participant needed to notice they flew past the 
opening to the valley WP 4, and not use the small mountains off the right-hand-side of 
the aircraft to notice that they were too far north.  It is assumed that Participant 5 did not 
notice these terrain features, and at pause point 4, they still believed they were on-track 
and had scenery that resembled WP 4.  Because Participant 5 was in area that could 
resemble WP 4, they could have overweighed their visual cue and not considered that 
they were in a different valley, or ~H.  This could have led Participant 5 to misperception 
type 2.  Misperception type 1 could have also occurred because Participant 5 believed 
they were on-track and a valley should be seen at the waypoint, i.e., p(d|H) is high.  
Figure 25 shows the differences in prior and posterior probabilities for pause point 4 for 
Participant 5 acting as a Bayesian agent and for misperception types 1 and 3.  Figure 25 
assumes that p(d|H) = p(d|~H) = 0.9, which is high because WP4 and pause point 4 are 




Figure 25.   Column chart comparing Participant 5 during route 3 at pause point 4, 
assuming a high p(d|H) = p(d|~H) = 0.9 and p(H) is the CONF at pause 
point 3 which is 0.84.  Notice that the p(H|d), or misperception 2,  increases 
from prior to posterior for misperception types. 
 Figure 25 shows that the posterior probability increases for p(H|d) for the 
misperception types 1 and 2 while the probability for the Bayesian agent stays the same.  
This result shows how Participant 5 could have been acting under a biased perception 
leading them to miscalculate their location, yet remain confident. 
 After the initial misperception of Participant 5 at pause point 4, they misperceived 
pause point 5 and 6.  Both of these pause point misperceptions relate to misperception 
type 3.  While the aircraft is transiting down the wrong valley, there are visual cues that 
would allow the pilot to update their position and correct their perception.  The first 
visual cue is that the Northern valley is much larger than the correct one to the South.  
This incorrect valley has a noticeable small mound in the middle of it, and it remains flat 
while the correct valley is narrow with increasing terrain after waypoint 5.  Although 
Participant 5’s CONF did reduce from pause point 5 to 6, it was still biased to the 
intended route of flight.  It is assumed that this reduction was mostly due to the small 
distance in perceived location between pause points 5 and 6.  Misperception 3 means that 


























 This chapter provided insights gained by modeling pilot perception and 
misperception during overland navigation in a Bayesian framework.  Pilots can correctly 
update their position in an unbiased manner using Bayesian updating when acting as a 
true Bayesian agent, and they can fall into one of the misperception types when not acting 
as a Bayesian agent. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION  
A. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
The largest limitations affecting this study was the limited number of available 
participants, and potential bias of aviators who are students/ staff at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, which could narrow the range of flight experience in the sample.  
To partially overcome this limitation, participants were recruited from students and 
faculty of the Naval Postgraduate School with various aviation communities and services, 
and had a wide range of experience levels.  Another limitation was the use of a simulated 
environment and not actual aircraft.  However, this drawback was minimized by using 
realistic outside and inside cockpit views.  It has also been shown that navigation in a 
virtual environment correlates to real world navigation (Hahn, 2005).  Due to safety 
concerns, this study could not be conducted at this altitude in a real aircraft over similar 
terrain.   
Human confidence is complicated.  People have different perspectives and 
different baselines of confidence.  Because of this variability between individuals, 
correlation of confidence is based off a specific route at a specific time. Self-reported 
confidence was assumed to be linear on a 0 to 100% scale.   
Another limitation of the experiment was the relatively small field of view and no 
depth perception of the OTW display.  In the real world, pilots have the ability to scan 
left and right, but in this experiment, they were limited to looking directly in front of the 
aircraft with a 65-degree field of view.  This made the navigational task more challenging 
because precise dead reckoning requires the pilot to get the intersection of at least two 
bearing lines off known terrain features.  With only the forward view, the baring lines are 
at acute angles making it hard to get an exact pinpoint of location.  To compensate for 
this, the participants were informed that the experiment was not seeking the exact 
location, but rather the general area.  In addition, the challenging navigational task 
increased the workload and stress that can be compared to real navigation.  Also, small 
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field of views and no depth perception are experienced in actual operating conditions 
when using night vision goggles with 40-degree field of view limitations. 
Developing routes for the experiment is a difficult task because the subjects have 
varied navigational and flight experiences.  The experiment should be set up in a way that 
each participant has a reasonable expectation of both success and failure.  Because of this 
fact, four routes including two autonavigation routes had to be developed in order span 
all experience levels.  Another limitation of the experiment was the required pause points.  
The pause points required stops in navigation that could have an adverse effect on the 
experiment.  To reduce the effect of pausing the navigation task, participants were told 
that marking their perceived location and confidence should take five seconds and not 
more than ten.  This time limitation helped reduce the irritation of pausing the navigation, 
and also did not allow the participant extra time to study the map and OTW display to 
enhance their navigation performance.  Participants were also polled after the navigation 
task, and none believed that the pause points had a negative effect on their navigational 
task.  The pause points also caused difficulty in participants who wanted to use timing to 
supplement their visual navigation.  The digital clock they were provided on their 
instrument cluster was constantly running, and it did not stop when the navigation was 
paused.  Again, this forced the participants to focus on their visual navigation, and not 
dead reckoning. Pausing is another aspect of this study that could not be performed in an 
aircraft. 
The final limitation of the experiment dealt with the map display. The participants 
were not allowed to use the paper map that they used for their map study.  This did take 
away from some of the realism of the simulation.  Real world navigation involves 
multiple techniques including GPS navigation, visual navigation, and instrument 
navigation focusing on heading and timing.  For the purpose of this experiment, we 
focused on the visual navigation. The map display causes the participant to focus on this 
area, with minor use of heading and timing.  Another simulation question arose about 
how to deal with the orientation of the map.  During real world map navigation the 
PNAC usually orients the map in the direction of travel. This eases the cognitive tasking 
of orienting outside objects to the helicopter.  Having to deal with manually orienting the 
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map and flying, increased the workload inside of the simulated cockpit.  For this 
experiment, allowing the participants to change the heading of the map caused an 
additional distraction and reduced the amount of normalization for the experiment.  
Having the map automatically adjust to the helicopter heading demonstrated to be 
disorienting to some participants (Sullivan 2010).  Because they were not the ones 
moving the map, it was hard for them to regain their location after moving from the OTW 
to the map display. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
This experiment showed that pilots have biased perception when they are 
executing low level navigation routes.  The participants in this study were in the 
“dangerous” quadrant of the navigation performance matrix (Off-track and High CONF) 
27% of the time, which was second only to On-track and High CONF.  Of the time that 
the participants were Off-track, they had a corresponding High CONF 77.9% of the time.  
This shows that the participants overestimated their navigation performance, yet in a post 
task questionnaire only two of the 15 participants believed they were overconfident in 
their navigation abilities.  This again shows that there is lack of correlation between 
performance and confidence.  Just as participants were biased towards overestimates of 
personal ability in Stone’s (1993) research, the participants in my experiment 
overestimated their navigation performance in the complex cognitive task of navigation 
without their knowledge.  That participants are overestimating their abilities without their 
recognition can be the cause of mishaps and mission failures, just as unrecognized spatial 
disorientation is the most dangerous disorientation and is attributed to the most 
disorientation mishaps. 
The next important result from the study is that there is no correlation between 
navigation performance and confidence, yet there is correlation between the distance 
between perceived location and intended route versus confidence.  This suggests that the 
further a pilot is away from their perceived location; their corresponding confidence does 
not decrease.  The correlation between perceived location and intended route versus 
confidence suggests that the pilots would decrease their confidence the further from their 
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perceived location was from the intended route.  This shows that the pilots could have a 
bias towards the intended route of flight. 
Data from this experiment also showed that participant’s total flight hours, 
experience with low-level desert navigation, and whether the participant participated in 
similar experiment had little effect on the above results.  This result suggests that 
navigation misperception is a symptom of traits ingrained in human nature.  If this is the 
fact, additional training and technologies will have to be developed in order to override 
this biased thinking. 
The final conclusion is that the output from this experiment could allow low-level 
helicopter navigation to be modeled in a Bayesian framework in order to understand pilot 
misperception.  The experiment showed that when a participant is not acting as a 
Bayesian agent, they can fall into one of the three misperception types: 1. Pilots take the 
map data and try to fit it into what they see OTW.  2.  Pilots assume that the terrain that 
they see cannot look like terrain in a similar area.  3.  Pilots disregard visual cues that do 
not fit into their current belief. 
C. IMPLEMENTATION 
Direct implementation of the results from this experiment to new procedures and 
technologies is difficult because it involves personal confidence.  The most important 
result from the experiment is that there needs to be training on this subject to give pilots 
the ability to recognize that confidence does not correspond to correctness during 
navigation.  A single simulator event, possibly conducted in conjunction could be 
implemented into the Advanced Helicopter Flight Training at NAS Whiting Field and 
possibly to the Aviation Pre-Flight Indoctrination (API) at NAS Pensacola, along with 
the corresponding Army and Air Force helicopter training schools, based on the finding 
of this experiment.  Results from this experiment could also be added to aviation 
physiology and safety center documents. 
Results from this experiment also suggest that helicopter navigation equipment is 
important for correct navigation performance.  Any improvements in navigation 
equipment technology, that would reduce the reliance on visual navigation, would relate 
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to less mishaps and mission failures.  Current fleet navigation equipment requires large 
amount of pilot input.  Reducing the pilot input requirements can allow the PNAC to 
better execute other duties in the cockpit. 
The last implementation of the results from this experiment involves changing the 
Go-No-GO requirements for overland navigation.  Currently GPS is considered a 
supplemental navigation devise, and it is not required to execute overland low-level 
navigation.  This experiment shows that is not uncommon for pilots to misperceive their 
location just using visual navigation, and this misperception could be alleviated with 
navigational equipment like GPS. 
D. FUTURE WORK 
To enhance the results of this experiment a larger sample size spanning different 
experience and communities could be used.  The larger sample size would allow for a 
better experience grouping of participants (expert, intermediate, and novice).  Being able 
to effectively group the participants could provide insights into “overconfident” or 
“dangerous” population.  This could pinpoint where dedicated time and technology needs 
to be spent. 
The experiment could also be conducted under realistic operation environments.  
These environments could be nighttime, emergencies, and different weather conditions.  
Again this would enhance the data for real world operations. 
The last future work is to combine model data to pilots as they are flying in a 
training simulator.  This would be a real-time interactive training system that would 
notify pilots about the dangers and occurrence of misperception.  This training would 
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Scheduled Arrival Time: 
Actual Arrival Time:  
Hello and welcome.  Thank you for participating.   We hope that your participation will 
ultimately lead to improvements in our understanding of pilot misperception during 
overland navigation.  
Today we’ll be asking you to complete a four short navigation exercise using a pc-based 
simulation.  Before and after the navigation, we’ll ask you to fill out some short 
questionnaires related to your background and experience.  During the navigation we will 
be pausing the simulation and asking you to pinpoint where on the map you are, and at 
what confidence (100 very confident….0 very lost). 
We hope to take less than 45 minutes.  We ask for uninterrupted participation.  During 
the simulation exercise and when near equipment, please observe no food/drink 
restrictions.  If you need to use a restroom they are located across the breezeway, through 
the double doors and to the left.  Bottled water is available in the fridge by the door. 
Are you ready to go on? 
The next step is to make sure you understand any risks, the voluntary nature of 




















Subject ID:  
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Pilot Misperception During Overland Navigation: Simulation Exercise Evaluation 
Experiment check list 
 
Subject ID:  
 E-mail confirming date and time 
 Notify lab participants of data collection time 
 Validate equipment hardware and software 
o Screen brightness and contrast settings 
o Lab lighting conditions 
 “Experiment in Progress” signs 
 Bottled water in fridge. 
 Introductory Script 
 Informed Consent 
 Background questionnaire 
 Map set up 
 Route brief 
 Trial period instructions 
 Audio recording equipment (storage media, files naming 
and backup scheme) 
 Navigation  exercise 
 Save and backup data; folder name: subject ID and date 
 Post exercise questionnaires 
 Wrap up and thank you, contact information 
 80 
 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Consent to Participate in Research 
 
Introduction.  You are invited to participate in a research study entitled “Pilot Confidence during 
Helicopter Overland Navigation.”  The purpose of the research is to give an understanding why 
pilots track off course during navigation. 
 
Procedures.  This study entails navigation through a simulated environment.  You will initially fill 
out a questionnaire on your experience level.  You will then be given a practice route to gain 
familiarity with the system.  Following the practice, you will fly four navigation routes all preceded 
by a map study.  The second two routes will be flown on autopilot, where the autopilot route may or 
may not be on course.   During the navigation you will be asked to pinpoint your location on a map, 
and the confidence of that location.  You will also be given questionnaires before and after each 
navigation route.  The experiment is expected to take no longer than 45 minutes.  We are expecting 
you to be one out the 20–30 participants in this study.  Audio will be recorded so that we can better 
replay the simulation and analyze the results.  The recording will be securely kept by the primary 
investigator, will be kept confidential, will be reported in an anonymous fashion, and will be erased 
after the required holding time. 
 
Location. The interview/survey/experiment will take place in the MOVES Institute, Watkins 
Building, Rm #212B. 
 
Cost.  There is no cost to participate in this research study.  
 
Voluntary Nature of the Study.  Your participation in this study is strictly voluntary.  If you 
choose to participate you can change your mind at any time and withdraw from the study. You will 
not be penalized in any way or lose any benefits to which you would otherwise be entitled if you 
choose not to participate in this study or to withdraw.  
 
Potential Risks and Discomforts. The potential risks of participating in this study are minimal.  
There is a risk of potential data mismanagement.  
 
Anticipated Benefits.  Anticipated benefits from this study are to understand the reason for pilot 
visual perception during overland navigation; increasing the ability to train future pilot and giving 
recognition and better practices to current pilots. You may not directly benefit from your 
participation in this research.  The alternative to participating in the research is to not participate in 
the research. 
 
Compensation for Participation.  No tangible compensation will be given.   
Confidentiality & Privacy Act.  Any information that is obtained during this study will be kept 
confidential to the full extent permitted by law. All efforts, within reason, will be made to keep 
your personal information in your research record confidential but total confidentiality cannot be 
guaranteed.  All references to data collected will be made anonymous.  Your name will be 
encoded as a participant number.  Only principle investigators will have access to this key that 
translates to an identification number to your name.  
Date:  
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If you consent to be identified by name in this study, any reference to or quote by you will be 
published in the final research finding only after your review and approval. If you do not agree, 
then you will be identified broadly by discipline and/or rank, (for example, “fire chief”). 
 I consent to be identified by name in this research study. 
 I do not consent to be identified by name in this research study.  
Points of Contact.  If you have any questions or comments about the research, or you experience 
an injury or have questions about any discomforts that you experience while taking part in this 
study please contact the Principal Investigator, Dr. Ji Hyun Yang,  jyan1@nps.edu.  Questions 
about your rights as a research subject or any other concerns may be addressed to the Navy 
Postgraduate School IRB Chair, CAPT John Schmidt, USN, 831–656–3864, jkschmid@nps.edu. 
 
Statement of Consent. I have read the information provided above. I have been given the 
opportunity to ask questions and all the questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I have 
been provided a copy of this form for my records and I agree to participate in this study. I 
understand that by agreeing to participate in this research and signing this form, I do not waive 
any of my legal rights. 
 
 
________________________________________  __________________ 
Participant’s Signature     Date 
 
 
________________________________________  __________________ 




























Pilot Misperception During Overland Navigation:  Simulation Exercise Evaluation 
 Background Questionnaire 
 
 
We are interested in learning about your navigation and flight experiences. 
 
1. Please provide the following information: 
Age                                Gender  
 
The following questions ask about your navigation experiences. 
 
2. To what extent have you participated in activities other than overland navigation that 
may contribute to improved navigation skills? (Examples may include sport 
orienteering, land navigation exercises, boy/girl scouts etc.)? 
 

















3. At your peak of currency, how would you rate your navigation skills in a low-level 
(below 200’ AGL) overland environment? 
     
Poor Fair Average Good Excellent 
 
4. If tasked today, how would you rate your navigation skills in a low-level (below 200’ 
AGL) overland environment? 
     
Poor Fair Average Good Excellent 
 
5.  How much experience do you have with low level navigation in mountainous desert 
terrain? 
 
     
None Very Little Somewhat Considerable Extensive 
 
 
6. How much low level navigation experience do you have in the 29 Palms area? 
 
     




Pilot Misperception During Overland Navigation:  Simulation Exercise Evaluation 
 Background Questionnaire 
 
The following questions ask about your flight experiences.  
1.  Please provide  the following information: 
 








Years of aviation experience:  
 
2. How many months has it been since your last flight? 
 
3. How many months has it been since your last overland navigation flight? 
 
4. If applicable, how many months has it been since your last search and rescue 
mission? 
 
5. Describe your operational flying experience:  
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Exercise Evaluation 




If you believed that you did not hit every waypoint: 









































Pilot Misperception During Overland Navigation:  Simulation Exercise 
Evaluation 





If you believed that you did not hit every waypoint: 
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If you believed that you misinterpreted your position: 












 What techniques could you have used in order to gain better confidence of  
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If you believed that you misinterpreted your position: 












 What techniques could you have used in order to gain better confidence of  
















Pilot Misperception During Overland Navigation:  Simulation Exercise Evaluation 
 Post-Questionnaire 
 
1. What do you think is the most common reason why pilots stray off course? 
 

















2. If you are in a situation where there is a chance you are not on course, do you. 
 
     
Continue with 
your current 
track and hope 




Return to the 
point where 
you know you 
were on-track 
and start over 
Stop at your 
current position 
and try to make 
sense of your 
surrounding 
Circle the area 
and hope to 
break out more 
notable terrain 
features 






3. Do you feel that you are over-reliant on your navigation equipment like GPS? 
 
     
Never 
 





4. Do you feel that it is easy to misperceive terrain features when you are on low 
level navigation routes?  
 
     





5. Do you feel that you are overconfident in your flight and or navigation 
capabilities?  
 
     
Never 
6. Comments: 
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